Games without Rules

dc.creatorMenezes, Flavio
dc.creatorQuiggin, John
dc.date2017-04-01T19:46:08Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T07:12:11Z
dc.descriptionWe introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.151166
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151166/files/WPR04_7.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151166
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/585658
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/151166
dc.titleGames without Rules
dc.typeText

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