Multiplicity of investment equilibria when pollution permits are not tradable
| dc.creator | Karp, Larry S. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T20:09:56Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T02:49:50Z | |
| dc.description | We study a model in which the level of environmental regulation depends on abatement costs, which depend on aggregate levels of investment in abatement capital. Firms are non-strategic. When emissions quotas are not tradable, there are multiple competitive equilibria to the investment problem. Allowing trade in permits leads to a unique socially optimal equilibrium. For a given distribution of investment, allowing trade in permits has an ambiguous effect on the optimal level of regulation. Previous results on coordination games with non-atomic agents are applied to the problem of environmental regulation with endogenous investment in abatement capital. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.7202 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7202/files/wp061018.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7202 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/520926 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/7202 | |
| dc.title | Multiplicity of investment equilibria when pollution permits are not tradable | |
| dc.type | Text |