Networked Leaders in the Shadow of the Market – A Chinese Experiment in Allocating Land Conversion Rights

dc.creatorChau, Nancy H.
dc.creatorQin, Yu
dc.creatorZhang, Weiwen
dc.date2017-04-01T19:21:43Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T11:02:40Z
dc.descriptionConcerns over the loss of cultivated land in China have motivated a system of centrally mandated annual land use quotas effective from provincial down to township levels. To facilitate efficient land allocation, a ground-breaking policy in the Zhejiang Province permitted sub-provincial units to trade land conversion quotas. We theoretically model and empirically estimate the drivers of local government participation in this program to shed light more broadly on the drivers of local government decision-making. We find robust support for three sets of factors at the sub-provincial level: market forces, administrative autonomy, and prior network connections of local government leaders.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.250022
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/250022/files/Cornell-Dyson-wp1513.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/250022
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/624304
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/250022
dc.titleNetworked Leaders in the Shadow of the Market – A Chinese Experiment in Allocating Land Conversion Rights
dc.typeText

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