The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Economic Management in Oil Exporting Countries
No hay miniatura disponible
Fecha
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
World Bank, Washington, DC
Resumen
Descripción
Despite massive oil rent incomes since
the early 1970s, the economic performance of oil-exporting
countries-with notable exceptions-is poor. While there is
extensive literature on the management of oil resources,
analysis of the underlying political determinants of this
poor performance is more sparse. Drawing on concepts from
the comparative institutionalist tradition in political
science, the authors develop a generalized typology of
political states that is used in analyzing the political
economy of fiscal and economic management in oil-exporting
countries with widely differing political systems. In
assessing performance, the authors focus on issues of
long-term savings, economic stabilization, and efficient use
of oil rents. The comparisons of country experiences suggest
that countries with strong, mature, democratic traditions
have advantages in managing oil rents well because of their
ability to reach consensus, their educated and informed
electorates, and a high level of transparency that
facilitates clear decisions on how to use rents over a long
horizon. Yet even these systems, ensuring cautious use of
oil income is a continuing struggle. Traditional and
modernizing autocracies have also demonstrated their ability
to sustain long decision horizons and implement
developmental policies. But resistance to transparency and
the danger of oil-led spending and expenditure commitments
becoming the major legitimizing force behind the state may
pose risk to the long-term sustainability of their current
development strategies. In contrast, little positive effect
can be expected from the politically unstable, predatory
autocracies, which typically have very short policy horizons
and sometimes the characteristics of "roving
bandit" regimes. Factional democracies, with weak
political parties and highly personalized politics, present
particular challenges because they lack a sufficiently
effective political system to create a consensus among
strong competing interests. Special attention will be needed
to increase transparency and raise public awareness in these
countries. And oil rent makes it more difficult to sustain a
constituency in favor of sound, longer-run economic
management because it weakens incentives for agents to
support checks and balances that impinge on their individual
plans to appropriate the rents. The country comparisons
further demonstrate that technical solutions-such as the
establishment of oil stabilization funds and budgetary
reforms-to enhance transparency and efficiency in the use of
oil rents will not work well unless constituencies can be
developed in support of such measures.
Palabras clave
AGGREGATE DEMAND, AGRICULTURE, ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, AUTHORITY, BORROWING, BUDGET DEFICIT, BUDGET MANAGEMENT, BUDGET PROCESS, BUREAUCRACY, CASH PAYMENTS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CITIZENS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, COAL, COAL GASIFICATION, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, COMPETITIVENESS, COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL, CONSENSUS, CONSTITUENCIES, CONSTITUENCY, CONSTITUTION, CORRUPTION, CREDIT RATINGS, DEBT, DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS, DEFICITS, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, DISCOUNT RATES, DIVIDENDS, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ECONOMISTS, EFFICIENT USE, EMPLOYMENT, ENTITLEMENTS, EQUILIBRIUM, EXCHANGE RATE, EXPANSIONARY FISCAL, EXPENDITURE, EXPLOITATION, EXPORTS, FINANCIAL VIABILITY, FISCAL, FISCAL CRISES, FISCAL CRISIS, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, FISCAL DEFICITS, FISCAL DISCIPLINE, FISCAL POLICIES, FISCAL POLICY, FISCAL RESOURCES, FISHERIES, FORECASTS, FOREIGN LOANS, FUEL, FUEL PRICE, FUELS, FULL EMPLOYMENT, GDP, GDP PER CAPITA, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL, GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, GOVERNMENT REVENUE, GOVERNMENT SERVICES, GOVERNMENT SPENDING, GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET, HUMAN CAPITAL, INCOME, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INFLATION, LABOR MARKETS, LACK OF CLARITY, LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, LEGITIMACY, LEGITIMIZATION, LIVING STANDARDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, MARGINAL VALUE, MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, MONETARY POLICIES, MONETARY POLICY, MORAL HAZARD, NATIONAL CONSENSUS, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, NATIONAL INCOME, NATIONS, OIL, OIL EXPORTERS, OIL EXPORTING, OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES, OIL EXPORTS, OIL INDUSTRY, OIL MARKETS, OIL PRICES, OIL PRODUCERS, OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES, OIL RESERVES, OIL REVENUES, OPPOSITION PARTIES, PER CAPITA INCOME, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL ELITES, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICIANS, POPULATION GROWTH, POPULISM, PRICE INCREASES, PRIVATE SECTOR, PRODUCERS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PROVEN RESERVES, PUBLIC DEBT, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC FINANCE, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC RESOURCES, PUBLIC REVENUES, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT, PUBLIC SECTOR WAGES, PUBLIC SPENDING, PUBLIC WELFARE, RENT- SEEKING BEHAVIOR, RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR, REPRESENTATIVES, REVENUE MANAGEMENT, REVENUE SOURCES, REVENUE VOLATILITY, ROADS, SAVINGS, SOCIAL PROGRAMS, STAGFLATION, STATE ENTERPRISES, STATE INSTITUTIONS, STATE POWER, STREAMS, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, TAX, TAX ADMINISTRATION, TAX BURDEN, TAX REVENUES, TAXATION, TRANSPARENCY, URBAN POPULATION, VOTERS, WAGES, WEALTH, WORLD DEMAND