Endogenous Institution Formation under a Catching-up Strategy in Developing Countries
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Washington, DC: World Bank
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This paper explores endogenous
institution formation under a catching-up strategy in
developing countries. Since the catching-up strategy is
normally against the compartive advantages of the developing
countries, it can not be implemented through laissez-faire
market mechanisms, and a government needs to establish
nonmarket institutions to implement the strategy. In a
simple two-sector model, the authors show that an
institutional complex of price distortion, output control,
and a directive allocation system is sufficient to implement
the best allocation for the catching-up strategy.
Furthermore, removing any of the three components will make
it no longer implementable. The analysis also compares the
best allocation and prices under the catching-up strategy
with their counterparts under no distortions. The results of
this paper provide important implications for understanding
the institution formation in the developing countries that
were pursuing a catching-up strategy after World War II.
Palabras clave
ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL, AGRICULTURE, ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL, BENCHMARK, BUDGET CONSTRAINT, BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, CAPITAL ALLOCATION, CAPITAL GOODS, CAPITAL INCOME, CAPITAL INVESTMENT, CAPITAL NEEDS, COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, COMMODITIES, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES, COMPETITIVE MARKETS, CONSUMER DEMAND, CONSUMPTION DECISIONS, CONSUMPTION GOOD, CONSUMPTION GOODS, CONTROL VARIABLE, CONTROL VARIABLES, CONTROLLED PRICES, DEMAND FUNCTION, DEMAND FUNCTIONS, DEPRESSION, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRY, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, DISTORTIONS, ECONOMETRICS, ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS, ECONOMIC POLICY, ECONOMIC POWER, ECONOMIC REFORM, ECONOMIC SIZE, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, EQUILIBRIUM, EQUILIBRIUM PRICE, EQUILIBRIUM PRICES, EQUILIBRIUM VALUE, EQUILIBRIUM VALUES, EXCESS DEMAND, EXCESS SUPPLY, EXPORTS, FACTOR PRICES, FOREIGN TRADE, FREE MARKET, FREE MARKET ECONOMY, GDP, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP, GROWTH RATES, IMPORT, INCOME, INCOME LEVEL, INCOME LEVELS, INCOMES, INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS, INTEREST RATE, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LIVING STANDARDS, MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, MARGINAL COST, MARGINAL REVENUE, MARGINAL UTILITY, MARGINAL UTILITY OF CONSUMPTION, MARKET ECONOMIES, MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, MARKET INTEREST, MARKET INTEREST RATES, MARKET MECHANISM, MARKET MECHANISMS, MARKET-CLEARING LEVEL, MARKET-CLEARING LEVELS, MULTIPLIERS, OPTIMAL ALLOCATION, OPTIMAL ALLOCATIONS, OUTPUT OF CAPITAL, OUTPUTS, PERFECT COMPETITION, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL REGIME, PRICE CONTROL, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, PRICE DISTORTION, PRICE LEVELS, PRICE OF GOOD, PRICE REGULATION, PRIMARY COMMODITIES, PRIVATE MARKET, PRODUCTION COSTS, PRODUCTION FUNCTION, PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS, RAPID DEVELOPMENT, RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH, RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION, RELATIVE PRICE, RELATIVE PRICES, RETURNS, SALE, SHADOW PRICES, SOCIALIST ECONOMIES, SUBSTITUTION, SURPLUS, TOTAL OUTPUT, TRADE REGIMES, TRADING, UTILITY FUNCTION, WAGES, WELFARE ECONOMICS
