How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorCigno, Alessandro
dc.date2013-08-22T21:27:53Z
dc.date2013-08-22T21:27:53Z
dc.date2012-01-18
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:11:36Z
dc.descriptionBecause credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierWorld Bank Economic Review
dc.identifier1564-698X
dc.identifierdoi:10.1093/wber/lhr038
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/15309
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/15309
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/415983
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank
dc.relationWorld Bank Economic Review
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectaccount
dc.subjectborrowing
dc.subjectChild Labor
dc.subjectChild Labour
dc.subjectDevelopment Economics
dc.subjecteconomic analysis
dc.subjecteconomics
dc.subjectemployment
dc.subjectemployment opportunities
dc.subjectfamily members
dc.subjectgeneral equilibrium
dc.subjecthuman capital
dc.subjectincome
dc.subjectinsurance
dc.subjectLabor Economics
dc.subjectlabor market
dc.subjectmoral hazard
dc.subjectPolitical Economy
dc.subjectschool attendance
dc.subjectyoung children
dc.titleHow to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typeArticle de journal
dc.typeArtículo de revista

Archivos

Colecciones

AgroKnow