Can Islands of Effectiveness Thrive in Difficult Governance Settings? The Political Economy of Local-level Collaborative Governance
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Many low-income countries contend with a
governance syndrome characterized by a difficult combination
of seeming openness, weak institutions, and strong
inter-elite contestation for power and resources. In such
countries, neither broad-based policy nor public management
reforms are likely to be feasible. But are broad-based
approaches necessary? Theory and evidence suggest that in
such settings progress could be driven by "islands of
effectiveness" -- narrowly-focused initiatives that
combine high-quality institutional arrangements at the
micro-level, plus supportive, narrowly-targeted policy
reforms. This paper explores whether and how local-level
collaborative governance can provide a platform for these
islands of effectiveness. Drawing on the analytical
framework developed by the Nobel-prize winning social
scientist Elinor Ostrom, the paper reviews the underpinnings
of successful collaborative governance. It introduces a
simple model for exploring the interactions between
collaborative governance and political economy. The model
highlights the conditions under which coordination is
capable of countering threats from predators seeking to
capture the returns from collaborative governance for
themselves. The relative strength in the broader environment
of two opposing networks emerges as key -- "threat
networks" to which predators have access, and
countervailing "trumping networks" on which
protagonists of effective collaborative governance can draw.
The paper illustrates the potential practical relevance of
the approach with three heuristic examples: the governance
of schools, fisheries, and road construction and
maintenance. It concludes by laying out an agenda for
further empirical research, and suggesting what might be the
implications of the approach for future operational practice.
Palabras clave
ACCOUNTABILITY, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, BANKS, BEST PRACTICE, BINDING CONSTRAINTS, BRIBE, BRIBES, BUREAUCRACY, BUREAUCRATIC ACTORS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, COALITIONS, COLLECTIVE ACTION, CONSTITUTIONS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORRUPT, CORRUPTION, CREDIBLE COMMITMENT, DECISION MAKING, DECISION-MAKING, DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, DISCRETION, DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ECONOMICS, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, EMPIRICAL BASIS, EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, ENVIRONMENTAL, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISTS, ENVIRONMENTS, EQUILIBRIUM, EXCHANGE OF IDEAS, FINANCIAL RESOURCES, FISHERIES, FISHING, FORMAL INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE, GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS, HISTORIANS, INCOME, INITIATIVE, INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, INTEGRITY, JUSTICE, LEADERSHIP, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, LOCAL COMMUNITY, LOCAL LEVELS, MARGINAL COST, MONOPOLY, NATIONAL LEVEL, PATRONAGE, POLICY MEASURES, POLICY REFORM, POLICY REFORMS, POLICY RESEARCH, POLITICAL DYNAMICS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL ELITES, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL STABILITY, POLITICAL STRUGGLE, POLITICIANS, POOR PERFORMANCE, PRESIDENCY, PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, PROCUREMENT, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC AGENCIES, PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC RESOURCES, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION, PUBLIC SERVICES, REVOLUTIONS, SANCTION, SANCTIONS, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, SERVICE DELIVERY, SOCIAL COST, SOCIAL LEARNING, SOCIAL NORMS, SOCIAL RETURNS, SOCIAL SCIENCES, STATE FAILURE, TRANSPARENCY, TRANSPARENT INFORMATION, VIOLENCE