TRANSACTION COSTS, FADS, AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED MISDIRECTION IN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
| dc.creator | Huffman, Wallace E. | |
| dc.creator | Just, Richard E. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T20:14:40Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:23:37Z | |
| dc.description | This paper examines efficiency implications of national and local policies for fund allocation and management of agricultural research, which produce pure and impure public goods. The possibility is examined that competitive grants programs increase rent seeking activities by scientists relative to specific block grants or formula allocations and thereby reduce both the real resources available to produce traditional research outputs and the productivity with which research resources are used. Management of local research units, including advantages of incentive compatible contracts, is also considered. Additional conceptual and empirical work are needed before the issues are resolved. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.18240 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18240/files/isu277.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18240 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/531773 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/18240 | |
| dc.title | TRANSACTION COSTS, FADS, AND POLITICALLY MOTIVATED MISDIRECTION IN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH | |
| dc.type | Text |