Rational Expectation and Education Rewarding: The Case of Chinese Off-Farm Wage Employment

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dc.creatorHou, Linke
dc.creatorWang, Xiaobing
dc.creatorYu, Xiaohua
dc.date2017-04-01T13:55:33Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T05:45:05Z
dc.descriptionThis study establishes a life-cycle model that a representative agent chooses optimal time of education to maximize his/her life earning, which implies that there may exist nonlinear relation between education and earning. Using the data of Chinese off-farm wage employment, we find that the duration of schooling years will increase by 1.7 years with 1 percent increase in rate of return to education. The empirical results also indicate that controversies about return to education might arise from model misspecification without consideration of nonlinearity and sample selection.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.114530
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/114530/files/Hou_Linke_278.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/114530
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/567882
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/114530
dc.titleRational Expectation and Education Rewarding: The Case of Chinese Off-Farm Wage Employment
dc.typeText

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