Special Interests Versus the Public Interest: The Determination of Policy Instruments
| dc.creator | Rausser, Gordon C. | |
| dc.creator | Roland, Gerard | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:57:37Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:28:52Z | |
| dc.description | This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agriculture. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.37533 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/37533/files/CUDARE%201057%20Raussera.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/37533 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/550535 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/37533 | |
| dc.title | Special Interests Versus the Public Interest: The Determination of Policy Instruments | |
| dc.type | Text |