Endogenous Technology and Tradable Emission Quotas
| dc.creator | Golombek, Rolf | |
| dc.creator | Hoel, Michael | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:58:57Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:03:14Z | |
| dc.description | We study an international climate agreement that assigns emission quotas to each participating country. Unlike the simplest models in the literature, we assume that abatement costs are affected by R&D activities undertaken in all firms in all countries, i.e. abatement technologies are endogenous. In line with the Kyoto agreement we assume that the international climate agreement does not include R&D policies. We show that for a second-best agreement, marginal costs of abatement should exceed the Pigovian level. Moreover, marginal costs of abatement differ across countries in the second-best quota agreement with heterogeneous countries. In other words, the second-best outcome cannot be achieved if emission quotas are tradable. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.12042 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12042/files/wp060042.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12042 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/525599 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12042 | |
| dc.title | Endogenous Technology and Tradable Emission Quotas | |
| dc.type | Text |