Wealth, Marriage, and Sex Selection

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorBorker, Girija
dc.creatorEeckhout, Jan
dc.creatorLuke, Nancy
dc.creatorMinz, Shantidani
dc.creatorMunshi, Kaivan
dc.creatorSwaminathan, Soumya
dc.date2025-06-17T16:47:44Z
dc.date2025-06-17T16:47:44Z
dc.date2025-06-17
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:31:45Z
dc.descriptionTwo mechanisms have been proposed to explain sex selection in India: son preference in which parents desire a male heir and daughter aversion in which dowry payments make parents worse off with girls. Our model incorporates both mechanisms, providing micro-foundations, based on the organization of the marriage institution, for daughter aversion. Marital matching, sex selection, and dowries are jointly determined in the model, whose implications are tested on a representative sample of rural households. Simulations of the model indicate that existing policies targeting daughter aversion might exacerbate the problem, while identifying other policies that could be effective.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099352406172541015
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/43345
dc.identifier10.1596/1813-9450-11147
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/405376
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWashington, DC: World Bank
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper; 11147
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectFAMILY ECONOMICS
dc.subjectSOCIAL NORMS
dc.subjectMARRIAGE MARKET
dc.subjectSEX SELECTION
dc.subjectCASTE
dc.subjectASSORTATIVE MATCHING
dc.subjectWEALTH DISTRIBUTION
dc.subjectINEQUALITY
dc.subjectCONTROL FUNCTION
dc.titleWealth, Marriage, and Sex Selection
dc.typeWorking Paper

Archivos

Colecciones

AgroKnow