ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE PRICING OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THE CASE OF UNMETERED WATER; Proceedings of the Fifth Joint Conference on Agriculture, Food, and the Environment, June 17-18, 1996, Padova, Italy
| dc.creator | Smith, Rodney B.W. | |
| dc.creator | Tsur, Yacov | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:27:53Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:10:36Z | |
| dc.description | This paper uses mechanism design theory to (i) propose a mechanism to price irrigation water when farmers are heterogeneous in their production technologies (adverse selection) and their individual water uses are unobserved (moral hazard) and (ii) discusses briefly when such a mechanism might be economically unreasonable. Unmetered irrigation water is often priced by imposing per-acre fees on cultivated acreage or by charging per-unit fees on observable inputs or outputs. The offered pricing procedure is based on the observed output and achieves a first-best outcome when implementation is free of transaction costs. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.14368 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14368/files/wp9646b.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14368 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/527904 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14368 | |
| dc.title | ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE PRICING OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THE CASE OF UNMETERED WATER; Proceedings of the Fifth Joint Conference on Agriculture, Food, and the Environment, June 17-18, 1996, Padova, Italy | |
| dc.type | Text |