A COMMENT ON KLIEVE-MACAULAY'S SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA GAME
| dc.creator | Simmons, Phil | |
| dc.creator | Wallace, Lee | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:35:27Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:40:36Z | |
| dc.description | Klieve and MacAulay (1993) (KM) analyse bargaining between the Australian and Japanese Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) industries using game theory. The KM model is a Nash equilibrium with symmetrical information, threat functions and a set of biological constraints. When we attempted to include the New Zealand SBT industry as a player in the KM model, we discovered important shortcomings in it. In this comment, we outline three major shortcomings in the KM model and propose an alternative model of a Nash equilibrium for the SBT industry. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.22675 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/22675/files/39030289.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/22675 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/538104 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/22675 | |
| dc.title | A COMMENT ON KLIEVE-MACAULAY'S SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA GAME | |
| dc.type | Text |