Market-Based Instruments for the Optimal Control of Invasive Insect Species: B. Tabaci in Arizona

dc.creatorRichards, Timothy J.
dc.creatorEllsworth, Peter
dc.creatorTronstad, Russell
dc.creatorNaranjo, Steve
dc.date2017-04-01T14:06:59Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T05:27:30Z
dc.descriptionInvasive insect species represent perhaps one of the most significant potential sources of economic risk to U.S. agricultural production. Private control of invasive insect species is likely to be insufficient due to negative externality and weaker-link public good problems. In this study, we compare a system of Pigouvian taxes with tradable permits for invasive species control. While the emissions control literature shows that taxes are preferred to permits under cost uncertainty, invasive-species control involves correlated cost and benefit uncertainty. Hence, we expect a quantity-based system to be preferred. Monte Carlo simulations of optimal steady-state outcomes confirm our expectations.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.97852
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/97852/files/JARE_Dec2010__01F_pp349-367.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/97852
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/563905
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/97852
dc.titleMarket-Based Instruments for the Optimal Control of Invasive Insect Species: B. Tabaci in Arizona
dc.typeText

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