Environmental Mechanism Designs in a New Order of Regulatory Capitalism
| dc.creator | Mullen, Jeffrey D. | |
| dc.creator | Centner, Terence J. | |
| dc.creator | Wetzstein, Michael E. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:55:19Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T02:55:41Z | |
| dc.description | Complexity of environmental programs is most apparent with information asymmetries, making the design of efficient mechanisms particularly challenging. As developed theoretically in this paper, a new regulatory capitalism paradigm mating voluntary agreements with environmental education can produce outcomes at least as efficient as voluntary agreements alone. Such a design exploits a key difference between voluntary agreements versus educational programs in terms of their impact on agents' incentive compatibilities. Specifically, in a principal-agent model, voluntary agreements are associated with an incentive-compatibility constraint, whereas educational programs are not. The efficient bundle will likely consist of a set of education programs and voluntary agreements. With the new order of regulatory capitalism, it is time to concentrate on removing barriers yielding inefficient mono-mechanism design and start constructing multidimensional incentives to efficiently allocate effort toward environmental and economic goals. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.9357 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/9357/files/sp07mu01.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/9357 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/523041 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/9357 | |
| dc.title | Environmental Mechanism Designs in a New Order of Regulatory Capitalism | |
| dc.type | Text |