ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WITH POLICIES FOR SALE
| dc.creator | Schleich, Joachim | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T14:03:52Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:48:49Z | |
| dc.description | This paper generalizes the Grossman-Helpman political economy model to characterize the structure of environmental and industry protection for a small open economy when domestic and/or trade policies are the outcome of a noncooperative common agency game between sector-specific producer lobbies and the government. For a consumption externality, the political equilibrium results if domestic and trade policies are available, are production-enhancing protection of organized industries, but the same environmental protection as Pigouvian taxes. Subsidies to organized industries counterbalance environmental taxes when there is a production externality, and it is ambiguous whether domestic or trade policy alone leads to more environmental protection. In addition, this paper demonstrates that the original Grossman-Helpman results arise as a special case that rests on the assumption that only trade policies are available to the government. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.51207 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/51207/files/97-2.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/51207 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/555215 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/51207 | |
| dc.title | ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WITH POLICIES FOR SALE | |
| dc.type | Text |