Envious Preferences in Two-sided Matching
| dc.creator | Ahamad, Mazbahul | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T14:41:58Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T10:30:22Z | |
| dc.description | We develop a model of two-sided matching problem with individual-sided envious preferences that originate from an emulative envy effect in which a more desirable state that is preferred is owned by the other individual. We assume envious preferences influence an individual’s decision to enter into a two-sided network instead of being unassigned. In this paper, we show that an individual-sided envious preference leads to a stable matching under a two-sided market framework. Applying the mechanism of the model to behavioral contract theory, we show that individual-proposing envious acceptance leads to stable farmer-buyer contract matching considering buyer’s time invariant preference. We further argue that individual’s envious preference also contributes to herd-type acceptance that dominates individual’s logical preferences in participation decision under a less risky environment. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.235482 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/235482/files/2016%20AAEA_ID_%20P8943_Envious%20Preferences%20in%20Two-sided%20Matching.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/235482 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/619408 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/235482 | |
| dc.title | Envious Preferences in Two-sided Matching | |
| dc.type | Text |