Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard
| dc.creator | Rouviere, Elodie | |
| dc.creator | Soubeyran, Raphael | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T20:02:19Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T02:47:29Z | |
| dc.description | This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.6325 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6325/files/wp080007.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6325 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/520072 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6325 | |
| dc.title | Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard | |
| dc.type | Text |