MARKET POWER AND OFF-INVOICE TRADE PROMOTIONS IN THE US: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorMaratou, Laoura
dc.creatorGomez, Miguel I.
dc.creatorJust, David R.
dc.date2017-04-01T13:45:19Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:30:52Z
dc.descriptionThis article employs a Tobit model to examine whether the market power of manufacturers and retailers influence trade promotion decisions in the US food sector. Greater retailer market power increases allocation of funds to off-invoice trade promotions. We find evidence that the balance of power favors food retailers.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20280
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20280/files/sp04ma08.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20280
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/533910
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20280
dc.titleMARKET POWER AND OFF-INVOICE TRADE PROMOTIONS IN THE US: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
dc.typeText

Archivos

Colecciones

University of Minnesota