EXTERNALITIES FROM ROAMING LIVESTOCK: EXPLAINING THE DEMISE OF THE OPEN RANGE
| dc.creator | Centner, Terence J. | |
| dc.creator | Griffin, Ronald C. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T14:55:25Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:12:10Z | |
| dc.description | Fence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto others' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers' neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Pareto optimal. Using a potential Pareto criterion, we show that a preference for fence-out in some areas may end as conditions change, such as increased nonranching land uses. Changed conditions may have legal consequences. Specific fence-out and fence cost-sharing provisions may be potentially Pareto inefficient and may be challenged for being unconstitutional under the due process clause. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.31183 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31183/files/23010071.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31183 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/546352 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31183 | |
| dc.title | EXTERNALITIES FROM ROAMING LIVESTOCK: EXPLAINING THE DEMISE OF THE OPEN RANGE | |
| dc.type | Text |