Externalities, Decreasing Returns, and Common Ownership
| dc.creator | Simpson, R. David | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T20:00:16Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T02:58:52Z | |
| dc.description | Placing production units under common ownership is often suggested as a solution to the problem of externalities. This will not always be true when there are decreasing returns to scale. An atomistic industry could be more efficient than a monopoly in some instances. Even when the "optimal" industry configuration would involve a finite number of producers, no two may have appropriate incentives to combine. An omniscient and benign regulator can always assure a more efficient outcome than would result from the combination of private producers. Whether real-world regulators should be called upon, however, is less clear. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.10457 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10457/files/dp010041.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10457 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/524129 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10457 | |
| dc.title | Externalities, Decreasing Returns, and Common Ownership | |
| dc.type | Text |