Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-Based Evidence From Meiji Japan

dc.creatorWeese, Eric
dc.creatorHayashi, Masayoshi
dc.creatorNishikawa, Masashi
dc.date2017-04-01T13:44:28Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T09:48:47Z
dc.descriptionDoes the exercise of the right of self-determination lead to inefficiency? This paper considers a set of centrally planned municipal mergers during the Meiji period, with data from Gifu prefecture. The observed merger pattern can be explained as a social optimum based on a very simple indiidual utility function. If individual villages had been allowed to choose their merger partners, counterfactual simulations show that the core is always non-empty, but core partitions contain about 80% more (post-merger) municipalities than the social optimum. Simulations are possible because core partitions can be calculated using repeated application of a mixed integer program.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.211545
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/211545/files/japan7.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/211545
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/612545
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/211545
dc.titleInefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-Based Evidence From Meiji Japan
dc.typeText

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