Political Stabilization Cycles in High Inflation Economies
| dc.creator | Stein, Ernesto | |
| dc.creator | Streb, Jorge | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:46:30Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T10:21:42Z | |
| dc.description | High inflation economies do not always exhibit smooth inflationary processes; sometimes stop-go cycles of inflation are observed. This paper relates these stop-go episodes to a political cycle: Governments can defer inflation until after elections to increase their chances of being reelected. This is modelled as a two-period game of incomplete information where voters try to pick the most competent candidate, and inflation (which is used as a signal of competency) can be lowered by the government in the short run through foreign debt accumulation. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.233383 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/233383/files/cal-cider-c094-039.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/233383 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/617984 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/233383 | |
| dc.title | Political Stabilization Cycles in High Inflation Economies | |
| dc.type | Text |