Balancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages

dc.creatorFan, Maoyong
dc.creatorLee, Myoungki
dc.creatorWu, Steven Y.
dc.date2017-04-01T20:20:47Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:31:19Z
dc.descriptionUsing a dynamic principal-agent model, we analyze termination damages that protect growers from contract termination or non-renewal. We show that government imposed breach damages can be distortionary and may not necessarily lead to increased grower welfare.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20392
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20392/files/sp04fa07.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20392
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/534122
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20392
dc.titleBalancing Grower Protection Against Agency Concerns: An Economic Analysis of Contract Termination Damages
dc.typeText

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