Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core
| dc.creator | Dimitrov, Dinko | |
| dc.creator | Haake, Claus-Jochen | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T20:02:17Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:03:42Z | |
| dc.description | We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.12175 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12175/files/wp060072.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12175 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/525732 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12175 | |
| dc.title | Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core | |
| dc.type | Text |