Tariff-Rate Quotas, Rent-Shifting and the Selling of Domestic Access
| dc.creator | Larue, Bruno | |
| dc.creator | Lapan, Harvey E. | |
| dc.creator | Gervais, Jean-Philippe | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:18:19Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T05:13:57Z | |
| dc.description | Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) have replaced quotas at the end of the Uruguay Round. We analyze TRQs when a foreign firm competes against a domestic firm in the latter’s market. Our benchmark is the strategic rent-shifting tariff. We show that the domestic price-equivalent TRQ is a better instrument welfare-wise, as it can extract all of the rents from the foreign firm. We show that different pairs of within-quota tariff and quota can support full rent extraction. The implication is that reduction of the former and enlargement of the latter, holding the above-quota tariff constant, may have no liberalizing effects. The first-best TRQ and the strategic tariff generate different prices. When firms have identical and constant marginal cost, the first-best TRQ entails selling a subsidy to the foreign firm and forcing the exit of the domestic firm. | |
| dc.identifier | Other:1496-5208 | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.90591 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/90591/files/laruelapangervais11-1.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/90591 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/560827 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/90591 | |
| dc.title | Tariff-Rate Quotas, Rent-Shifting and the Selling of Domestic Access | |
| dc.type | Text |