TESTING FOR COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF LAND TENURE CONTRACTS IN TEXAS

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dc.creatorDasgupta, Siddhartha
dc.creatorLove, H. Alan
dc.creatorKnight, Thomas O.
dc.creatorDevadoss, Stephen
dc.date2017-04-01T15:22:32Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:33:24Z
dc.descriptionShare contracts under information asymmetry often involve input application and risk sharing inefficiency. These difficulties are nullified under full information which can be approximated in repeated contracts. We give evidence of cooperation in repeated contracts, indicating the existence of full information efficiency and efficient resource use, despite underlying information asymmetry.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20917
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20917/files/spdasg01.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20917
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/535047
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20917
dc.titleTESTING FOR COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF LAND TENURE CONTRACTS IN TEXAS
dc.typeText

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