SPATIAL COMPETITION IN OVERLAPPING SEASONAL FISHERIES: A BIOECONOMIC MODEL OF FISHERMEN AND REGULATORS

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorAbbott, Joshua K.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:22:46Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:31:17Z
dc.descriptionThis paper develops a single-season dynamic game between fishermen and regulators. Fishermen maximize the NPV of profits by their location choice in a system with congestion, adjustment costs, and adaptive, quota-driven, site closures. Simulation results reveal feedbacks between site-choice and closure decisions and suggest the usefulness of spatial policy instruments in reducing congestion externalities and costly congestion-averting expenditures.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.20383
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20383/files/sp04ab01.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20383
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/534113
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/20383
dc.titleSPATIAL COMPETITION IN OVERLAPPING SEASONAL FISHERIES: A BIOECONOMIC MODEL OF FISHERMEN AND REGULATORS
dc.typeText

Archivos

Colecciones

University of Minnesota