Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment
| dc.creator | Saak, Alexander E. | |
| dc.date | 2015-10-02 | |
| dc.date | 2024-08-01T02:51:16Z | |
| dc.date | 2024-08-01T02:51:16Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-06-27T14:59:58Z | |
| dc.description | This paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static model where the buyer has private information about quality, sellers have private information about the cost and choice of effort, and quality is not contractible. | |
| dc.identifier | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150279 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/91634 | |
| dc.language | en | |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | |
| dc.rights | Open Access | |
| dc.source | Saak, Alexander E. 2015. Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment. Economic Letters 136(November 2015):88 - 9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.014 | |
| dc.subject | moral hazard | |
| dc.subject | monitoring | |
| dc.subject | quality | |
| dc.subject | management | |
| dc.title | Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment | |
| dc.type | Journal Article |