Decentralization, Service Delivery, and Legitimacy: The Case of Mali
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Washington, DC: World Bank
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In fragile, conflict-affected, and violent contexts, decentralization is widely promoted to improve service delivery and strengthen the social contract by shifting power closer to citizens. However, empirical evidence on whether these reforms deliver in environments marked by weak state capacity and low institutional trust remains limited. This paper evaluates Mali’s Project for the Deployment of State Resources for the Improvement of Services program, which implemented performance-based conditional grants across 102 communes between 2021 and 2024. Drawing on administrative budget data and georeferenced Afrobarometer survey data, the study assesses the impacts of performance-based conditional grants on local fiscal performance, service delivery, and institutional legitimacy. The results show that a 1 percent increase in performance-based conditional grant allocations is associated with a 1.2 percent increase in investment expenditures and measurable improvements in budget balances. Expenditures were reallocated toward social sectors (education, health, water, and agriculture), consistent with program objectives. A difference-in-differences analysis points to statistically significant increases in citizen satisfaction with public services, particularly health (+2.6 percentage points), water and sanitation (+1.4), and education (+1.0), as well as an 18.4-point rise in trust in municipal councils. Institutional “spillover” effects extended to the national level, with trust in the presidency and parliament increasing by 9.1 and 7.3 points, respectively. A scenario-based cost-effectiveness analysis points to potentially substantial returns under the stated assumptions. Illustrative estimates suggest that observed trust gains could be associated with USD 57 million to USD 141 million in additional annual tax revenues, equivalent to 1.1 to 2.8 times the program’s total cost, through enhanced voluntary compliance—assuming a transmission of trust into compliance broadly consistent with parameters in the literature. These findings are consistent with the view that well-designed performance-based transfers may improve service outcomes and contribute to rebuilding public trust in fragile, conflict-affected, and violent contexts, with effects that appear to extend beyond the local level. Policy implications include considering institutionalization of the performance-based conditional grants within Mali’s fiscal architecture and the design of a medium-term roadmap for sustainability and possible scale-up.
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DECENTRALIZATION, PERFORMANCE-BASED GRANTS, LOCAL GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY, INSTITUTIONAL TRUST, FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES (FCAS), FISCAL TRANSFERS, CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS, AFROBAROMETER