CONTROL OF NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION THROUGH VOLUNTARY INCENTIVE-BASED POLICIES: AN APPLICATION TO NITRATE CONTAMINATION IN NEW YORK

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dc.creatorBoisvert, Richard N.
dc.creatorPeterson, Jeffrey M.
dc.date2017-04-01T17:42:52Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T04:13:03Z
dc.descriptionA voluntary program is developed to achieve environmental goals through the self-interested choices of farmers under environmental risk and asymmetric information. Farmers behave to maximize expected net returns, and environmental quality standards are formulated through chance constraints. Because the government may not know each farmer's soil type, policy options must be self-selecting. The model is applied empirically to nitrate leaching and runoff from corn production in three New York regions. Asymmetric information between producers and the government would impose additional cost burdens on society, but these costs are modest in the context of other farm programs.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.31421
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31421/files/30020127.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31421
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/546590
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31421
dc.titleCONTROL OF NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION THROUGH VOLUNTARY INCENTIVE-BASED POLICIES: AN APPLICATION TO NITRATE CONTAMINATION IN NEW YORK
dc.typeText

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