Aid Tying and Donor Fragmentation

Vista sencilla de ítem
dc.creatorKnack, Stephen
dc.creatorSmets, Lodewijk
dc.date2012-03-19T17:28:28Z
dc.date2012-03-19T17:28:28Z
dc.date2012-01-01
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T01:01:04Z
dc.descriptionThis study tests two opposing hypotheses about the impact of aid fragmentation on the practice of aid tying. In one, when a small number of donors dominate the aid market in a country, they may exploit their monopoly power by tying more aid to purchases from contractors based in their own countries. Alternatively, when donors have a larger share of the aid market, they may have stronger incentives to maximize the development impact of their aid by tying less of it. Empirical tests strongly and consistently support the latter hypothesis. The key finding -- that higher donor aid shares are associated with less aid tying -- is robust to recipient controls, donor fixed effects and instrumental variables estimation. When recipient countries are grouped by their scores on corruption perception indexes, higher shares of aid are significantly related to lower aid tying only in the less-corrupt sub-sample. This finding is consistent with the argument that aid tying can be an efficient response by donors when losses from corruption may rival or exceed losses from tying aid. When aid tying is more costly, as proxied by donor country size and income, it is less prevalent. Aid tying is lower in the Least Developed Countries, consistent with the OECD Development Assistance Committee's recommendation to its members.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20120105100233
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/3219
dc.identifier10.1596/1813-9450-5934
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/414261
dc.languageEnglish
dc.relationPaper is funded by the Knowledge for Change Program (KCP),Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5934
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectADVERSE IMPACT
dc.subjectAID
dc.subjectAID COORDINATION
dc.subjectAID FLOWS
dc.subjectAID PROGRAMS
dc.subjectAUTONOMY
dc.subjectBILATERAL AID
dc.subjectCAPITAL MARKETS
dc.subjectCARTEL
dc.subjectCOMPANION
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE ECONOMICS
dc.subjectCOMPETITIVENESS
dc.subjectDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT AID
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT BENEFITS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT FINANCING
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT GOALS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT IMPACT
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ISSUES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT POLICY
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
dc.subjectDONOR AGENCIES
dc.subjectDONOR AGENCY
dc.subjectECONOMETRICS
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subjectEXCLUSION
dc.subjectFOOD AID
dc.subjectGAPS
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectGDP PER CAPITA
dc.subjectINCLUSION
dc.subjectINCOME
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL AID
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectLDCS
dc.subjectMONOPOLY
dc.subjectMORAL HAZARD
dc.subjectPER CAPITA INCOME
dc.subjectPER CAPITA INCOMES
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPRIORITIES
dc.subjectPUBLIC GOOD
dc.subjectSTAGFLATION
dc.subjectSTD
dc.subjectSTRESSES
dc.subjectTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
dc.subjectTRANSACTIONS COSTS
dc.subjectUTILITY FUNCTION
dc.subjectVALUE ADDED
dc.subjectWORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
dc.titleAid Tying and Donor Fragmentation

Archivos

Colecciones

AgroKnow