United We Vote

dc.creatorEguia, Jon X.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:32:25Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:03:42Z
dc.descriptionThis paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also determine whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and we find the different optimal internal voting rules that aggregate preferences within the coalition.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.12172
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12172/files/wp060009.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12172
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/525729
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12172
dc.titleUnited We Vote
dc.typeText

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