Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance: Actuarial and Asymmetric Information Incentives

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dc.creatorJust, Richard E.
dc.creatorCalvin, Linda
dc.creatorQuiggin, John
dc.date2017-04-01T14:08:28Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T08:49:29Z
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.197809
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/197809/files/agecon-maryland-94-22.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/197809
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/603016
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/197809
dc.titleAdverse Selection in Crop Insurance: Actuarial and Asymmetric Information Incentives
dc.typeText

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