Getting institutions “Right” for whom? Credit constraints and the impact of property rights on the quantity and composition of investment

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dc.creatorCarter, Michael R.
dc.creatorOlinto, Pedro
dc.date2003-02
dc.date2024-10-24T12:52:44Z
dc.date2024-10-24T12:52:44Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T15:28:17Z
dc.descriptionProperty rights reform is typically hypothesized to boost investment through investment demand and credit supply effects. Yet when the credit supply effect is muted, property rights reform would be expected to induce liquidity‐constrained farms to reduce investment in movable capital even as they increase investment in attached capital. This expectation is corroborated by econometric analysis of panel data from Paraguay. While all farmers experience a positive investment demand effect, liquidity‐constrained producers correspondingly reduce their demand for movable capital. Given an estimated pattern of wealth‐biased liquidity constraints, property rights reform will get institutions “right” for only wealthier producers.
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/157966
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/105388
dc.languageen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.rightsLimited Access
dc.sourceCarter, Michael R.; Olinto, Pedro. 2003. Getting institutions “Right” for whom? Credit constraints and the impact of property rights on the quantity and composition of investment. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85(1): 173-186. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8276.00111
dc.subjectproperty rights
dc.subjectinvestment
dc.subjectcredit policies
dc.titleGetting institutions “Right” for whom? Credit constraints and the impact of property rights on the quantity and composition of investment
dc.typeJournal Article

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Instituto Internacional de Investigación sobre Políticas Alimentarias (IFPRI)