Pricing Games in Poultry Markets: The Cases of Eggs in Australia and Chicken in Canada
| dc.creator | Shank, Benjamin | |
| dc.creator | Goddard, Ellen W. | |
| dc.creator | Freebairn, John W. | |
| dc.creator | Griffith, Garry R. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:21:18Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T05:07:59Z | |
| dc.description | Given the increasing concentration in numerous markets recent interest in market structure and performance has grown dramatically. The empirical research revolves around theories of industrial organization and non-cooperative game theory. Research in this area uses participant strategic action not only to define market structure but also participant conduct. In the Australian egg market and Canadian fresh chicken market we reject the more competitive assumption of Bertrand-Nash behavior in favor of Stackelberg/leader-follower relationships. In Australia Pace Farms emerges as the industry leader while in Canada generic product overwhelmingly controls the market. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.59707 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/59707/files/59707_1_.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/59707 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/559458 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/59707 | |
| dc.title | Pricing Games in Poultry Markets: The Cases of Eggs in Australia and Chicken in Canada | |
| dc.type | Text |