A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH TO ORGANIC FOODS: AN ANALYSIS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND POLICY
| dc.creator | McCluskey, Jill J. | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T20:11:56Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T04:12:41Z | |
| dc.description | Demand for healthy, safe and environmentally friendly food products has been increasing. In response, producers are marketing organic and other quality-differentiated foods, sometimes claiming to have followed sound environmental and animal welfare practices. These products frequently have unobservable quality attributes. If the profit-maximizing producer is able to deceive the consumer with a false claim, then he or she will enjoy a higher price with lower production costs (compared to the full disclosure outcomes). The analysis described in this paper shows that repeat-purchase relationships and third party monitoring are required for high-quality credence goods to be available. Policy implications of this analysis for national organic food standards are discussed. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.31334 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31334/files/29010001.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31334 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/546503 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/31334 | |
| dc.title | A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH TO ORGANIC FOODS: AN ANALYSIS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND POLICY | |
| dc.type | Text |