Voting for environmental policy under income and preference heterogeneity
| dc.creator | Huhtala, Anni | |
| dc.creator | Eerola, Essi | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T14:40:01Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T03:02:40Z | |
| dc.description | We examine the design of policies for promoting the consumption of green products under preference and income heterogeneity using organic food products as an example. Two instruments are considered: a price subsidy for the organic food products and a tax on the conventional products. Under income disparity, consumers with high income always prefer a socially optimal subsidy to a socially optimal tax, while low-income consumers prefer a tax on conventional products. When environmental policy is determined by the median voter, the policies implemented tend to be stricter than socially optimal policies if income differences are large. | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.11863 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/11863/files/dp050005.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/11863 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/525420 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/11863 | |
| dc.title | Voting for environmental policy under income and preference heterogeneity | |
| dc.type | Text |