MORAL HAZARD AND BT CORN REFUGE

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dc.creatorMitchell, Paul D.
dc.creatorZhu, En (John)
dc.date2017-04-01T17:34:31Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:38:23Z
dc.descriptionUsing a principal-agent model, we find the optimal subsidy contract that induces grower compliance with Bt corn refuge requirements for managing insect resistance when asymmetric information exists concerning grower behavior. The optimal contract balances the cost of monitoring and the benefit of reducing the likelihood of insect resistance.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.22113
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/22113/files/sp03mi04.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/22113
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/537167
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/22113
dc.titleMORAL HAZARD AND BT CORN REFUGE
dc.typeText

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