A CLASSROOM EXPERIMENT ON OLIGOPOLIES

dc.creatorNelson, Robert G.
dc.creatorBeil, Richard O., Jr.
dc.date2017-04-01T19:53:45Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T03:13:56Z
dc.descriptionThis experiment demonstrates principles of decision-making in dynamic oligopolies, especially the difficulties in forming and maintaining cartels. As an illustration of firm behavior under imperfect competition, the game distinguishes between procedurally rational choices and substantively rational decisions in the context of collusive, Cournot, and competitive equilibria. The paper discusses results from an actual classroom exercise and suggests some additional variations in institutional details. Instructions for students and a spreadsheet program for producing payoff tables are provided in the appendices.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.15353
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/15353/files/27010263.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/15353
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/528888
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/15353
dc.titleA CLASSROOM EXPERIMENT ON OLIGOPOLIES
dc.typeText

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