TRANSACTION COSTS, RISK AVERSION, AND CHOICE OF TENURE REVISITED

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dc.creatorBaron, Donald
dc.date2017-04-01T13:48:57Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T07:04:39Z
dc.descriptionThe related questions of how tenants and landlords choose leasing contracts and how these contracts affect efficient allocation of resources continue to divide economists This article rejects answers suggested by transaction cost models developed by Cheung and by Ip and Stahl and argues that among risk-averse farmers, contract choice is determined by the relative intensities of tenant and landlord aversion to risk The risk model examined here suggested that all contract forms - whether fixed rent, fixed wage, or crop share - can generally achieve the same allocative efficiency
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.148631
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/148631/files/4Baron_32_2.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/148631
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/584195
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/148631
dc.titleTRANSACTION COSTS, RISK AVERSION, AND CHOICE OF TENURE REVISITED
dc.typeText

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