Cutting Special Interests by the Roots

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dc.creatorBraganca, Arthur
dc.creatorDahis, Ricardo
dc.date2022-10-17T09:53:06Z
dc.date2022-10-17T09:53:06Z
dc.date2022-10-01
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:35:46Z
dc.descriptionGovernment policies may impact economic outcomes directly but also indirectly through effects on political incentives. This paper examines the effects of the PPCDAm, a centralized set of environmental policies that effectively raised the expected cost of illegal deforestation, on the behavior of a powerful special-interest group operating in the Brazilian Amazon: farmers. Using different identification strategies, we document that municipalities governed by farmer politicians experienced larger declines in deforestation, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and violence than municipalities governed by other politicians after this set of policies was implemented. Our findings suggest the PPCDAm had indirect and persistent effects on political incentives, amplifying its impact on environmental and social outcomes.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierJournal of Public Economics
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/38161
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/38161
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/406939
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rightsCC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectDEFORESTATION
dc.subjectENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
dc.subjectSPECIAL INTERESTS
dc.subjectSPILLOVERS
dc.titleCutting Special Interests by the Roots
dc.titleEvidence from the Brazilian Amazon
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.typeArticle de journal
dc.typeArtículo de revista

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