Inefficiency due to tenancy protection: a new tenure problem in Taiwan
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Fixed-rent tenancy was traditionally regarded as equally efficient as owner-cultivators.
The counter-example is, however, presented here. Specifically, tenants with fixed-rent contracts
and well protected by tenancy regulations may, in the long run, tum out to be less
efficient than other farmers (e.g., owner-cultivators and informal tenants), particularly when
they do not heavily depend on farm revenue as major source of family income. On the other
hand, tenants who are not benefited from tenancy regulations might not be less efficient than
owner-cultivators. The underlying implication is tenancy reform is not a panacea for
improving farming efficiency; it may result in many negative effects in the long run.