Why industrial policies fail : limited commitment

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dc.creatorKarp, Larry S.
dc.creatorPerloff, Jeffrey M.
dc.date2017-04-01T20:05:01Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T02:46:48Z
dc.descriptionThe strategic effects of subsidies on output and subsidies on investment differ substantially in dynamic models where a government's commitment ability is limited. Output subsidies remain effective even as the period of commitment vanishes. but investment subsidies may become completely ineffective. This difference has been obscured because most existing models of strategic trade policy are static.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.6098
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6098/files/wp930533.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6098
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/519859
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6098
dc.titleWhy industrial policies fail : limited commitment
dc.typeText

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