Trademark Protection or Protectionism?
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
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This paper explores the extent to which
discrimination against foreign applicants in the trademark
registration process can be used as a
"behind-the-border" barrier to imports.
Prima-facie evidence shows that in some developing countries
the ratio of trademark registration to applications is much
higher for national than for foreign applicants, which is
consistent with the notion of discrimination against foreign
firms. The authors develop a simple model that suggests that
incentives to discriminate are stronger when foreign firms
produce products that are close in quality to the product
produced by domestic firms. This hypothesis is then tested
and empirically confirmed in three of the four countries in
their sample, suggesting that discretion and discrimination
in the trademark registration process can sometimes be used
as a protectionist tool.
Palabras clave
TRADEMARKS, TRADE REGULATION, EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, IMPORTS, TRADE BARRIERS AGRICULTURE, BRANDS, CD, CONSUMER SURPLUS, CONSUMERS, DISCRIMINATION, DOMESTIC MARKET, DOMESTIC PRODUCTS, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, EXPORTS, FISH, FUTURE RESEARCH, HOME MARKET, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, IMPORTS, INCOME, INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, LAWS, LEGISLATION, MARKET MECHANISM, MARKET SEGMENTATION, MARKET SHARE, MERCHANDISE, METALS, PERFECT INFORMATION, PRODUCERS, PRODUCT QUALITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PROTECTIONISM, QUALITY STANDARDS, QUOTAS, SALES, SURPLUSES, TRADE BARRIERS, TRADEMARKS, TRANSACTION COSTS, WILLINGNESS TO PAY, WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION