Stigma and the Take-up of Social Programs
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Empirical studies send mixed messages as
to the magnitude of social stigma associated with the
take-up of social transfers and the impact of stigma on
take-up. These mixed signals may be related to the fact that
stigma and program participation are likely to be jointly
determined. If there is a high (low) degree of participation
in a program, stigma is likely to be lower (higher) due at
least in part to that high (low) degree of participation.
This is because the more eligible persons participate, the
less one can single out specific individuals for stigma
because they use the program. This note suggests this
theoretically with a simple model showing that we may have
in an idealized setting two equilibria: one with stigma and
zero participation in a social program, and one with perfect
participation and no stigma.
Palabras clave
AGGREGATE DEMAND, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, DISABILITY, ECONOMETRICS, ECONOMIC COST, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, ECONOMIC THEORY, FAMILIES, FAMILY MEMBER, FAMILY RESOURCES, GAME THEORY, HOUSEHOLDS, HOUSING, INCOME, INCOME LEVEL, INEQUALITY, INTERNATIONAL BANK, JOB LOSS, MEDICAID, NASH EQUILIBRIUM, PENSIONER, PENSIONERS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, PUBLIC FINANCE, RECEIPT, SOCIAL ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL EXCLUSION, SOCIAL SERVICE, STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES, TAKE-UP RATE, TAKE-UP RATES, TAX BENEFITS, UTILITY FUNCTION, WEALTH, WELFARE SYSTEM