Initial Allocation Effects in Permit Markets with Bertrand Output Oligopoly
| dc.creator | Calford, Evan M. | |
| dc.creator | Heinzel, Christoph | |
| dc.creator | Betz, Regina | |
| dc.date | 2017-04-01T19:48:53Z | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-09T05:22:23Z | |
| dc.description | We analyse the efficiency effects of the initial permit allocation given to firms with market power in both permit and output market. We examine two models: a long- run model with endogenous technology and capacity choice, and a short-run model with fixed technology and capacity. In the long run, quantity pre-commitment with Bertrand competition can yield Cournot outcomes also under emissions trading. In the short run, Bertrand output competition reproduces the effects derived under Cournot competition, but displays higher pass-through profits. In a second-best setting of overallocation, a tighter emissions target tends to improve permit-market efficiency in the short run. | |
| dc.identifier | Other:ISSN 1835-9728 | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.22004/ag.econ.95066 | |
| dc.identifier | https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/95066/files/Initial%20Allocation%20Effects%20in%20Permit%20Markets%20with%20Bertrand%20Output%20Oligopoly.pdf | |
| dc.identifier | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/95066 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/562797 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | ||
| dc.source | http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/95066 | |
| dc.title | Initial Allocation Effects in Permit Markets with Bertrand Output Oligopoly | |
| dc.type | Text |