Political Ideology, Quality at Entry and the Success of Economic Reform Programs

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dc.creatorSmets, Lodewijk
dc.creatorKnack, Stephen
dc.creatorMolenaers, Nadia
dc.date2012-12-07T23:21:08Z
dc.date2012-12-07T23:21:08Z
dc.date2012-07
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-01T00:59:04Z
dc.descriptionThis study investigates how government ideology matters for the success of World Bank economic policy loans, which typically support market-liberalizing reforms. A simple model predicts that World Bank staff will invest more effort in designing an economic policy loan when faced with a left-wing government. Empirically, estimates from a Heckman selection model show that the quality at entry of an economic policy loan is significantly higher for governments with a left-wing party orientation. This result is robust to changes in the sample, alternative measures of ideology, different estimation techniques and the inclusion of additional control variables. Next, robust findings from estimating a recursive triangular system of equations indicate that leftist governments comply more fully with loan agreements. Results also suggest that World Bank resources are more productive -- in terms of reform success -- in the design of policy operations than in their supervision. Anecdotal evidence from several country cases is consistent with the finding that left-wing governments receive higher quality loans.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/plain
dc.identifierhttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/07/16496879/political-ideology-quality-entry-success-economic-reform-programs
dc.identifierhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/11949
dc.identifierhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6130
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/413861
dc.languageEnglish
dc.languageen_US
dc.publisherWorld Bank, Washington, DC
dc.relationPolicy Research Working Paper; No. 6130
dc.rightsCC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rightsWorld Bank
dc.subjectACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subjectADJUSTMENT
dc.subjectAGRICULTURE
dc.subjectBALANCE OF PAYMENTS
dc.subjectBANK DEBT
dc.subjectBANK POLICY
dc.subjectBANK SUPERVISION
dc.subjectBORROWER
dc.subjectBORROWING
dc.subjectCOMMITMENT
dc.subjectCOMMITMENTS
dc.subjectCOMPARATIVE ECONOMICS
dc.subjectCONDITIONALITY
dc.subjectCREDIBILITY
dc.subjectDEBT
dc.subjectDEBT REDUCTION
dc.subjectDECISION MAKING
dc.subjectDEMOCRACY
dc.subjectDEREGULATION
dc.subjectDEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT BANK
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT BANKS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
dc.subjectDEVELOPMENT POLICY
dc.subjectDISBURSEMENTS
dc.subjectDISCOUNT RATE
dc.subjectECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT
dc.subjectECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectECONOMIC OUTCOMES
dc.subjectECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
dc.subjectECONOMIC POLICY
dc.subjectECONOMIC REFORM
dc.subjectECONOMIC SECTORS
dc.subjectENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
dc.subjectEQUATIONS
dc.subjectFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
dc.subjectFINANCIAL SECTOR
dc.subjectFISCAL DEFICIT
dc.subjectFISCAL REFORM
dc.subjectFOREIGN AID
dc.subjectGDP
dc.subjectGDP PER CAPITA
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT CAPACITY
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
dc.subjectGOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP
dc.subjectGROWTH RATE
dc.subjectHUMAN DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectIDA CREDITS
dc.subjectINCOME GROWTH
dc.subjectINCOME TAX
dc.subjectINFLATION
dc.subjectINFLATION RATE
dc.subjectINFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL BANK
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
dc.subjectINVESTIGATION
dc.subjectINVESTING
dc.subjectINVESTMENT PROJECTS
dc.subjectLEADERSHIP
dc.subjectLENDING DECISIONS
dc.subjectLENDING INSTRUMENT
dc.subjectLENDING VOLUME
dc.subjectLEVY
dc.subjectLOAN
dc.subjectLOAN AGREEMENT
dc.subjectLOAN AGREEMENTS
dc.subjectLOAN AMOUNT
dc.subjectLOAN COVENANTS
dc.subjectLOAN DISBURSEMENTS
dc.subjectLOAN QUALITY
dc.subjectLOAN SIZE
dc.subjectLOAN SUPERVISION
dc.subjectLOANS TO COUNTRIES
dc.subjectMACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS
dc.subjectMACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
dc.subjectMACROECONOMIC POLICY
dc.subjectMACROECONOMICS
dc.subjectMARKET REFORM
dc.subjectMARKET REFORMS
dc.subjectMARXISM
dc.subjectMAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
dc.subjectMINISTER
dc.subjectMOBILE PHONE
dc.subjectMONETARY POLICY
dc.subjectMONOPOLY
dc.subjectNATURAL DISASTERS
dc.subjectPERSONAL INCOME
dc.subjectPOLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subjectPOLITICAL LEADERS
dc.subjectPOSITIVE COEFFICIENT
dc.subjectPRIVATIZATION
dc.subjectPRODUCT MARKETS
dc.subjectPUBLIC SERVICES
dc.subjectREGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS
dc.subjectREGIONAL DUMMIES
dc.subjectRETURNS
dc.subjectRULING PARTY
dc.subjectSTRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
dc.subjectSUBVENTIONS
dc.subjectTAX
dc.subjectTAX REFORM
dc.subjectTAXATION
dc.subjectTELECOMMUNICATIONS
dc.subjectTRADE BARRIERS
dc.subjectTRADE POLICY
dc.subjectTRANCHE
dc.subjectTRANCHES
dc.subjectTRANSPORT
dc.subjectURBAN DEVELOPMENT
dc.subjectUTILITY FUNCTION
dc.subjectUTILITY MAXIMIZATION
dc.subjectVALUE ADDED
dc.subjectVOTERS
dc.subjectWORLD BANK LENDING
dc.subjectWORLD BANK LOAN
dc.titlePolitical Ideology, Quality at Entry and the Success of Economic Reform Programs

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