International environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment

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dc.creatorHong, Fuhsai
dc.creatorKarp, Larry S.
dc.date2017-04-01T13:56:03Z
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-09T06:03:44Z
dc.descriptionWe modify a canonical participation game used to study International Environmental Agreements (IEA), considering both mixed and pure strategies at the participation stage, and including a prior cost-reducing investment stage. The use of mixed strategies at the participation stage reverses a familiar result and also reverses the policy implication of that result: with mixed strategies, equilibrium participation and welfare is higher in equilibria that involve higher investment.
dc.identifierdoi:10.22004/ag.econ.123719
dc.identifierhttps://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123719/files/Karp%20CUDARE%201129.pdf
dc.identifierhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123719
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/571865
dc.languageeng
dc.publisher
dc.sourcehttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/123719
dc.titleInternational environmental agreements with mixed strategies and investment
dc.typeText

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University of Minnesota